University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Montana Public Affairs Report

Economics

6-1977

Montana Public Affairs Report, June 1977
University of Montana (Missoula, Mont. : 1965-1994). Bureau of Government Research.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mtpa-report

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
University of Montana (Missoula, Mont. : 1965-1994). Bureau of Government Research., "Montana Public
Affairs Report, June 1977" (1977). Montana Public Affairs Report. 15.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mtpa-report/15

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Public Affairs Report by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

REPORT

Number 22--June 1977

UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
AUG 9
This article was submitted initially as a research
paper for my course, Canadian Government and
Politics. I recommended its publication both because
of its intrinsic merit and because it addresses matters of
vital concern to Montanans. To conserve space, the
footnotes and bibliography have been omitted.
Mr. Hoklin served as Legislative Assistant to
Congressman Max Baucus prior to the time when this
paper was drafted. His duties on the staff of the
Congressman brought him into contact with the Cabin
Creek controversy. Thus, he was able to bring to the
preparation of this paper a perspective not normally
possible in student research. The opinions expressed in
the article are those of Mr. Hoklin. The Bureau takes
no position other than to encourage the expression and
dissemination of informed opinion on issues of public
consequence.
A lifelong resident of Montana, Lonn Hoklin served
as a combat soldier in Viet Nam with the U.S. Army,
1969-1971. He is currently completing requirements
for a B.A. Degree in History from the University of
Montana. He has recently accepted the position of
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General of
Montana.
Thomas Payne
Professor of
Political Science
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LllRARY

Cabin Creek Realities
by Lonn Hoklin

I
The North Fork of the Flathead River begins in the high
country just south of the village of Fernie, British Columbia,
and winds toward the U.S.-Canada boundary through an
undeveloped valley walled on the American side by the
majestic, heavily forested mountains of Glacier National
Park. Five miles northeast of Columbia Falls, Montana, the
North Fork joins the Middle Fork which rushes out of
Montana's fabled Bob Marshall Wilderness, to flow
thereafter 'into Flathead Lake, America's largest natural
body of fresh water west of the Mississippi.

The entire Flathead River drainage is rich in wildlife and
fish that depend on a delicate balance in the mountain
ecosystem. A well developed recreation and tourism
industry thrives on the Montana side. In recognition of the
unique natural and economic values of the area, the 94th
Congress enacted the Flathead Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
which established a federal policy of maintaining the river in
·
its natural, free-flowing state.
In 1968, Rio Algom Limited, a division of Britain's giant
Rio Tinto Zinc, embarked on a joint venture with Pan Ocean
Oil Limited of Calgary to conduct economic and engineering

studies for coal development in southeast British Columba.
Known as Sage Creek Coal Limited, the combine initiated
exploration on 24,652 acres of Crown Land (publicly
owned) as authorized by fifty-one separate licenses issued by
the government of British Columbia. Seven years of
mapping, trenching, drilling and underground sampling at a
cost of three million dollars resulted in Sage Creek's decision
to begin a final feasibility assessment of a particularly rich
site on two hills astride Cabin Creek, a tributary to
Montana's scenic Flathead River.
The hills contain an estimated 60 million tons of highquality metallurgical coal, worth approximately thirty
dollars per ton, about seven times as valuable as coal
produced in America's Northern Great Plains (due to higher
BTU content). Removing the coal, reported Bill Schneider,
editor of Montana Outdoors, requires virtual annihilation of
the two hills since the seams lie on an angle well beneath the
crests.
The initial flurry of American concern over the effects of
proposed Cabin Creek mining followed Schneider's
September, 1974, report in Montana Outdoors; central to
the public's misgivings was the question of whether
Montana's much loved Flathead Valley could be spared the
disasters of down-stream pollution from chemical leaching
and siltation - effects well known through past American
experience in the coal fields of Kentucky and Appalachia.
The crescendo of public outcries and the urgings of
Montana's congressional delegation compelled the U.S.
State Department to notify the Canadian government of
possible trans boundary difficulties relating to proposed coal
development at Cabin Creek. The federal governments
traded diplomatic notes, and various Montana political
leaders made exofficio contacts with Canadians at both the
national and provincial levels. Montana's U.S.
Representative Max Baucus flew to Toronto in April, 1975,
to confer directly with Rio Algom officials over the exact
nature of the compifoy's intentions at Cabin Creek and to
determine what steps might be taken to protect the Flathead
drainage. Upon his return to Washing-ton, Baucus issued a
detailed report on the meeting and called upon the State
Department to seek Canada's cooperation in referring the
Cabin Creek matter to the International Joint Commission

British Columbia are fully cognizant of the specific
constraints governing such adherence."
His inspection of the Cabin Creek site and conversations
with company officials, the congressman declared, indicated
that Rio Algom had ignored certain environmental
considerations, and gave reason to doubt that the company
would voluntarily suspend its development plans in the face
of evidence "demonstrating the imminence of serious
damage to the Flathead's sensitive aquatic species."
Moreover, Baucus charged, the government of British
Columbia had not indicated "beyond rather vague
assurances that such important factors as aquatic life are of
significant concern in setting criteria for the disposition of
mining lease applications."
The assurances sought by Baucus and others related to
coal production licensing, a matter in which the province of
British Columbia - not the Dominion - holds jurisdiction.
Canadian responses to American questions on all fronts had
consisted of general assurances that existing agreements
would be honored, i.e., those prohibiting transboundary
water pollution to the detriment of health or property on the
other side of the boundary; virtually every communication
from Canada emphasized that Rio Algom's activities to date
had been entirely preliminary in nature, and that the
company had yet to apply for coal production licensing.
These facts prompted the State Department to resist
recommendations for submitting the issue to the International Joint Commission, and to parry suggestions for
immediated consultations with the Canadians.
Baucus' October 2 letter to McCloskey recommended
immediate consultations between the Dominion, the
province, the State Department and Montana, a matter
Baucus continued to press through his staff and through
personal contact with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
and other officials. On October 16, 1975, due primarily to
Baucus' efforts, the State Department changed its mind and
drafted a diplomatic note to the Canadian Embassy which it
forwarded on October 20:
The United States Government is of the view that the Rio Algom Mines
project could seriously damage efforts to preserve the unique environmental
value of Glacier National Park, the Flathead National Forest, and the
Flathead River Basin and could cause injury to both public and private
property in these areas . . .
The Department of State therefore suggests that consultations be held
with respect to this matter at the earliest possible date.

(IJC).

"While I was encouraged by the prospect of an
environmental study and the willingness of the officials to
answer my questions," Baucus stated in the report, "as many
questions emerged as were answered."
Baucus and officials representing Montana's governor,
the U.S. State Department, the national Canadian
government and the province of British Columbia
subsequently toured the Cabin Creek site and received
briefings by Rio Algom officials. In October, 1975, however,
the vexing questions underscored by the Baucus Report of
six months earlier remained unanswered.
"Rio Algom Mines Limited has yet to guarantee with
satisfactory specificity that chemical leaching from the
excavations will not damage the transboundary flow to the
detriment of health and property," Baucus wrote to
Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey on October
2, 1975. "Serious questions remain as to whether siltation
can be prevented to a degree sufficient for adherence to the
Boundary Waters Treaty, and whether Rio Algom and

II
On January 11, 1909, American and British officials met
in Washington, D.C., to sign the Boundary Waters Treaty, a
list of formal provisions governing management of water
issues along the 5,500-mile U.S.-Canada boundary
(including the Alaska-Canada border). Article IV of the
treaty provides that "waters flowing across the boundary
shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or
property on the other." Article VII established an
International Joint Commission (IJC) to assist the
signatories in enforcement of the treaty. At this point, som~
examination of these two features is in order.
Article IV appears to many Americans to be a substantive
agreement which advances a prima facie guaranty that all
steps will be taken by both governments to prevent harmful
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requested by the two governments - assumes responsibility
for monitoring, surveillance and coordination of the
implementation. The object is to ensure compliance with the
agreement by all parties associated with the issue, be they
individuals, firms, or state, local or provincial governemnts;
evidence of noncompliance is reported to both national
governments.
The IJC has yet to exercise its fourth responsibility
because the two governments have yet to authorize it as
provided by Article X of the treaty. Were Canada and the
U.S. ever unable to come to terms on a given boundary
waters issue, an appropriate bilateral reference would
empower the IJC to adjudicate the matter after prior advice
and consent from the U.S. Senate and the Canadian
Governor General in Council.
It was noted earlier that Representative Max Baucus, after
his return from discussions with Rio Algom in Toronto,
urged the State Department to refer the Cabin Creek issue to
the IJC. A number of Western Montana citizens' groups
echoed Baucus' call throughout the following year, perhaps
with the uninformed judgment that the IJC had power to
"solve" the Cabin Creek problem authoritatively and
without delay. The State Department's public image
suffered somewhat for its resisting pleas for an IJC reference,
but subsequent conversation between State's Canadian desk
and Baucus' staff revealed the reasons for the resistance.
First, the State Department believed (right or wrong) that
the Cabin Creek issue had not yet developed sufficiently to
provide U.S. and Canadian negotiators the kind of specific
questions required for an IJC reference; Rio Algom, after
all, had not even applied for production licensing;
preliminary mining and marketing studies had not yet been
completed; no one had yet conducted an environmental
impact assessment. Moreover, the State Department had
only recently experienced a disastrous deadlock with the
Canadians over North Dakota's Garrison Diversion Project,
a matter referred to the IJC in desperation. Several
American observers believe that the State Department's
reluctance to seek another reference stemmed from a wish to
prove that diplomatic consultations outside the IJC can still
solve transboundary controversies, and that the IJC should
not become a "dumping ground" for hot issues.
Secondly, there was no guaranty that the IJC could
accomplish more than the current efforts. The professionals
at the State Department were aware of the issues under
discussion in diplomatic circles concerning the shortcomings
and limited capabilities of the IJC, especially with respect to
the rather lean financial resources afforded the Commission
by the two governments. Recent history has demonstrated
that the IJC is only as good as the political good will of the
current Canadian and American policy makers. No example
illustrates this more clearly than the performance of the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement signed by President
Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau in 1972.
The agreement resulted from an intensive IJC study of
Great Lakes pollution initiated by a reference from both
governments in 1964. In order to meet the objectives of the
agreement by the December 31, 1975, deadline Congress
amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1965,
which contained a general program of grants to the states for
construction of sewage and water treatment facilities.
Through amendments to the Act (in 1970 and 1972),

transboundary pollution - at least that's how Americans
are temped to read it, succumbing as they to do a passion for
explicitly written laws and regulations. In the United States a
treaty delivers the force and effect of law, and is thus readily
enforceable, but this is not necessarily the case in Canada.
While attending the 1976 session of the Canada-United
States Interparliamentary Group (Jan. 29-Feb. 2, Key
Biscayne, Fla.), a prominent Canadian Member of
Parliament (MP), Senator George Clifford Van Roggen of
British Columbia, remarked to an American delegate on the
legal status of international treaties in Canada. Treaties, Van
Roggen said, cannot be introduced or pleaded in Canadian
courts; in some matters, he added, the Dominion can
overrule provincial actions and policies, a statement that
Americans who fear for the Flathead might find
encouraging, particularly if they count on the Boundary
Waters Treaty for the Flathead's salvation. Such
"disallowances" by the Dominion, Van Roggen stressed on
the other hand, rarely occur. Since an examination of this
important side issue appears later, the immediate focus will
continue to be on the standing of treaties in Canada: based
on the inadmissability of treaties in Canadian courts, one
could state that treaties have standing only as administrative
instruments, and then only as they relate to federal actions
and policies because of the rarity of disallowances.
Since Canadian courts intervene into governmental
affairs only on the basis of administrative decisions - not on
matters of policy - a near total lack of legal standing for
treaties is implied. The Canadian system disallows judicial
review even of policies relating to treaty enforcement, so the
U.S. must rely on the good will of Canadian officials in
matters of enforcement, not on Canadian courts or on legal
standing. Fortunately for the U.S., Canadian good will has
remained steadfast since the inception of the Boundary
Waters Treaty.
The second feature of the treaty in need of some analysis is
the International Joint Commission, a creation of Article
VII. A quasi-judicial tribunal consisting of six
commissioners (three Canadian and three American), the
IJC carries out four distinct responsibilities - not as two
delegations under instructions from their respective
governments, but as a "single body."
One responsibility is to approve or deny "applications" for
the use, obstruction or diversion of transboundary waters in
order to ensure that all interests on both sides of the
boundary are duly protected or indemnified. Another
responsibility, perhaps the most critical to this study, is
investigation of specific boundary water problems after
receiving a "reference" from one or both governments.
Article IX of the treaty enables either government to refer an
issue to the IJC, but the traditional method has been
bilateral with both governments consulting in advance on
the "terms of reference," that is, the specific points and issues
with which the Commission should concern itself. Following
its investigation of the case within the parameters of the
reference, the IJC reports the ''facts and circumstances" to
the two governments along with its recommendations. Thus
prepared, the governments hold further consultations in
order to forge a workable solution to the problem.
A third responsibility hinges to some extent on the second.
After the governments have agreed to implement a solution
to a specific boundary waters problem, the IJC - when
3

Congress increased the federal share of funding to as much
as seventy-five percent for priority projects; for the threeyear period including 1975, Congress appropriated $18
billion to implement the Act.
Though he had co-signed the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement with Prime Minister Trudeau, President Nixon
vetoed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, which Congress enacted to implement
the agreement (in addition to meeting other objectives).
Congress, in turn, overrode Nixon's veto, but the President
then proceeded to impound $9 billion, half the appropriated
amount earmarked for grants to the states under the Act.
This lack of political "good will" delayed efforts to meet the
deadline set forth in the agreement. Despite numerous
examples of the IJC's successes, the record of the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement is evidence of an inherent
vulnerability within the system to lack of political good will
on the part of one or both governments.

1960s, the American companies which control the industry
have endured progressively heavier taxation by the province,
and have resisted provincial pressures to increase potash
production in the face of accelerating demand in the U.S.
agricultural market. The provincial government naturally
desires higher production in order to increase its share of
revenues and economic stimulus from potash sales, but the
companies fear depressed prices and lower profits resulting
from increased supply. Having periodically threatened
nationalization, the provincial government finally offered
legislation to do just that, a development that American
investors fear may irreparably damage U.S.-Canadian
commercial relations. Delegates to the 1976 meeting of the
Canada-U .S. Interparliamentary Group debated the issue at
length and focussed much attention on the question of
whether Canada's federal government should "disallow" the
provincial government's action in the interest of preserving a
critical feature of mutual relations. At length the Group
reached the conclusion that a Dominion veto of provincial
action is "more theoretical then fact," and that
nationalization of the potash industry is "clearly a matter
within the Provincial jurisdiction - which is closely guarded
"
The foregoing examples render a general perception of
provincial prerogatives in U.S.-Canadian relations and
illustrate the "confederal" relationship between the
provinces and the Dominion. More akin to the Cabin Creek
issue is the controversy surrounding the planned
construction of a 1,200-million watt coal-fired electric power
complex in southern Saskatchewan. The provincially owned
Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SPC) has laid plans to
dam the East Fork of the Poplar River in order to provide
cooling water for the complex. The river, unfortunately,
flows across the international boundary into Montana.
Following the announcement of SPC's plans on
September 11, 1974, the U.S. State Department received
protests from Montanans who feared damage not only from
SPC's appropriation of water, but also from imminent
pollution. Subsequent consultations between the federal
governments, Montana and Saskatchewan resulted in
formation of a joint U. S.-Canadian task force charged with
the responsibility of apportioning the Poplar's waters
equitably. Attendant issues relating to potential pollution
fell to the IJC in the course of its final evaluation of the task
force's apportionment. Though Saskatchewan had endorsed
formation of the task force, had agreed to participate in its
operation, and had expressed a willingness to pursue a
resolution of the conflict through traditional mechanisms,
the provincial government authorized SPC in the spring of
1976 to appropriate a considerable volume of the spring
runoff to fill a power plant reservoir situated two miles north
of th~ border. The action came after the task force's
announced intention to recommend to the IJC a 50-50
apportionment of the Poplar's waters, and before a public
hearing could be held in accordance with customary
procedure.
The result of Saskatchewan's apparently cavalier
treatment of the affair has been suspicion and uncertainty,
particularly on the part of Montanans, over the efficacy of
existing arrangements for dealing with transboundary water
issues. Ensuing negotiations concerning a formal bilateral
reference to the IJC have deadlocked over wording and

III

The importance of provincial good will to transboundary
water issues becomes more clear in light of the overall
provincial prerogatives in Canadian foreign policy.
Uninitiated American observers might recoil against the
reality that provinces do in fact conduct international
affairs, often separate and apart from any Dominion
guidance or control. Although American states exercise
various prerogatives in foreign issues, primarily in matters
involving international trade agreements, such transactions
occur within a well defined framework of federal authority.
No state legislature or governor presumes authority beyond
that of the president in setting foreign policy. Legislatures
and governors do issue symbolic policy statements in the
form of resolutions and decrees, often on such subjects as
United Nations membership and human rights, but
American federalism assigns no legal force and effect to such
actions. The Constitution stipulates that foreign policy will
be solely a function of the presidency with advice and
consent of the Senate.
This is not to say that Canadian federalism disallows a
unified national foreign policy. It does not. The following
examples, however, illustrate a degree of provincial
autonemy in foreign affairs not duplicated in the American
experience, and hopefully serve to place in perspective the
provincial role with respect to transboundary water issues.
In the winter of 1976, the world community experienced
tremors of apprehension over events in southern Africa. The
issue of black majority rule in white-ruled African states
exploded with a fury that not even the most well informed.
observers had foretold. Extensive news coverage, replete
with photographic footage of atrocities, assailed liberal
democratic sensibilities throughout the Western world. So
incensed was the government of Saskatchewan over the
adamancy of South Africa's white regime against granting
full political and civil rights to the black majority, that it
enacted a boycott of South African Wines, a substantial
import commodity. Such a boycott is unquestionably an act
of foreign policy.
A more dramatic act of provincial foreign policy occurred
on January 28, 1976, when Saskatehewan enacted a bill to
"nationalize" its resident potash industry. Since the mid4

Since relatively few of the British stock pioneers came
from other Canadian provinces, British Columbians have
virtually no tradition of bitterness against the United States
engendered by the American War for Independence. So
strong, in fact, have been American-British Columbian ties,
that a serious popular movement for American annexation
emerged periodically in the latter 1800s. This distinctly unCanadian experience has, however, completely run its
course and bears not at all on modern provincial politics and
attitudes.
British Columbia is no stranger to the arena of
transboundary water affairs, a fact dramatically illustrated
by its role in the implementation of the Columbia River
Treaty. The province also participated actively in the lengthy
discussions which led to the treaty's provisions, i.e., a plan
for "cooperative development of the water resources of the
Columbia River basin." Following trilateral proclamation
of the treaty by President Lyndon Johnson, Prime Minister
Lester Pearson and Premier William Bennett of British
Columbia on September 16, 1964, the provincially owned
British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority became the
prime Canadian entity for the implementation of a massive
project involving construction of hydroelectric generating
facilities, transboundary flood control, and apportionment
of waters. The Permanent Engineering Board of the
Columbia River Treaty concluded in its Annual Report to
the governments of the United States and Canada for 1976
that the work prescribed by the sixty-year agreement is on
schedule.
While the success of the Columbia River Treaty thus far
suggests that British Columbia is capable of masterful
negotiation and steady good will, a more recent affair
testifies to the institutional weaknesses examined earlier. In
1942, the International Joint Commission granted
perm_ission under Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty
to the Seattle City Light Company to raise the height of Ross
Dam, a hydro-electric generating facility on the Skagit
River, thirty miles south of the British Columbia boundary.
The additional height is needed, says the company, to raise
the level of the reservoir and thus increase generating
capacity for electricity-hungry Seattle. Because the plan
would inundate 5, 180 acres stretching eight miles into British
Columbia, the IJC's approval was contingent upon an
agreement between the province and the city of Seattle as to
appropriate compensation for the lost acreage. After twentyfive years of sporadic negotiation, Seattle and British
Columbia came to terms-Seattle would "rent" the
inundated land for ninety-nine years at an annual charge of
$34,566.21.
The story, unfortunately, does not end there. Shortly after
Seattle forwarded its first payment to Victoria, the
provincial government responded to growing public
indignation over the loss of land which is clearly a "unique
and irreplaceable natural asset." The parties to the rental
agreement went back to the conference table to spend an
additional three years before reaching a deadlock. In 1970,
Seattle applied to the Federal Power Commission for
permission to commence work on Ross Dam as authorized
by the IJC, while British Columbia sought reversal of the
IJC's original approval. Additional negotiations yielded no
resolution, but the IJC did agree to conduct an
environmental and ecological study to determine the effects

content. Whispered allegations of "deals" between the State
Department and Canada abound. The following excerpt
from an Environmental Quality Council staff report bears
witness to the public's misgivings as a result of
Saskatchewan's response to the Poplar River contrversy:
The treaty mechanism's emphasis on secrecy, its distance from the
problems and people affected, and its inherent limitation of considering
problems piecemeal and in isolation from the desires of affected citizens
may mean the 1909 treaty is in need of overhaul, replacement or revision.

Subjective judgments as to who is at fault in the Poplar
River controversy must be withheld until the facts are in, and
should not venture beyond statements of what has been
perceived by one side or the other. Unfortunately,
perceptions-not necessarily factual knowledge-often bear
heavily on the success or failure of international
consultations. Though Montanans now perceive
Saskatchewan negatively because of the Poplar River
developments, one should not assume that Saskatchewan is
a maverick that rides roughshod over international
agreements. The province has, in fact, a highly developed
political system and is considerably mor~ experienced in
international affairs than the state of Montana.
The lessons of the preceding examples are nonetheless
clear: provinces conduct foreign affairs, often independent
of the Dominion; provinces, even when entering into
international consultations to which the Dominion is a
party, exercise remarkable autonomy (witness
Saskatchewan's decision to apportion Poplar River water
contrary to previous agreements with Montana, the State
Department and the Dominion); successful operation of
existing institutions for dealing with transboundary water
problems requires provincial good will on he parts of the
respective federal governments.
IV
The staggeringly vast expanses of Canada's "prairie
provinces" roll steadily westward toward the majestic
Canadian Rockies, away from the more densely populated
"main stream" of Ontario and Quebec, the heartland of
Canada. Even further west, beyond the prairies and the
physical barrier of mountains, lies British Columbia,
forested, rich in minerals, and apart.
Insulated as it has been from the rest of Canada, British
Columbia has reached outward from its Pacific shores to
establish close and profitable relationships with merchants
and markets throughout the world, and has built cities that
are as beautiful as any on earth. That British Columbia
looked first to the Pacific and not to its sister provinces for
access to the outer world is understandable in more than
geographical terms: the vast majority of its settlers came on
ships and not on wagons or railroads. Many hailed from
non-Canadian lands in the British Commonwealth. Many
others were former Americans, fortune-seekers who found
no gold in California's Gold Rush of 1849 but who were
hearty enough to try it again in British Columbia's Rush of
1859. This, perhaps more than anything else, explains the
traditionally close associations between British Columbia
and the American Pacific states, particularly California.
5

of the plan. While the Commission studied, the FPC
deliberated on Seattle's application but has yet to reach a
decision.
In 1974, the government of British Columbia refunded
Seattle's rental payment and formally asked the IJC to
nullify its 1942 approval of Seattle City Light Company's
application. While the Commission has chosen not to act on
the request for the time being, it has formed a Canadian
environmental advisory group to reexamine the results of its
initial environmental study. Seattle City Light, in the
meantime, has invested more than five million dollars in a
project it considers certain to be licensed by the Federal
Power Commission, thus raising the spectre of its seeking
compensation from the province if efforts to halt the project
are successful.
The similarities of the Skagit River and Cabin Creek
issues are indeed striking, but they are hardly encouraging.
British Colum bians fear destruction of the Skagit Valley just
as Montanans fear for the Flathead River. The governments
of Montana and British Columbia both confront large, well
financed firms with enormous incentive to develop the
resources in the affected areas. Both must rely on the good
will of foreign governmnts and the operability of
international institutions in the defense of their respective
interests.
The dissimilarities, however, are as important, especially
from Montana's perspective. With respect to the Skagit
controversy, British Columbia's back is "against the wall."
The issue is far more advanced than the Cabin Creek matter
inasmuch as British Columbia's satisfaction hinges on
eventual reversal of an earlier IJC decision, an eventuality
that could have severe repercussions within the framework
of American-Canadian boundary affairs. Montanans must
consider the question of whether Federal Power
Commission licensing of the Ross Dam project would
destroy the good will required for satisfactory resolution of
the Cabin Creek issue since British Columbia holds the key
to protecting Montana's interest. Finally, Montana holds no
such key ot satisfying British Columbia with respect to the
Skagit Valley; that matter rests completely with other
American authorities and to some extent with the IJC.
The New Democratic Party (NDP) under David Barrett
headed the government of British Columbia during the
storm of controversy which led to the refunding of Seattle's
rental check. While there is no positive proof that the
Americans' treatment of the Skagit issue colored British
Columbia's reaction to the Cabin Creek issue, subsequent
developments suggest that the Barrett government was
reticent on the subject of Montana's interests, quite possibly
because it had its hands full in the area of transboundary
water problems.
This reticence first materialized in February of 1975, less
than a year after the NDP asked the International Joint
Commission to reverse its 1942 Skagit decision. A senior
reclamation officer of British Columbia's Department of
Mines and Petroleum Resources, J. D. McDonald, turned
down an invitation by Montana's Governor Tom Judge to
discuss the Cabin Creek ·problem with the Governor and
state resource officials. Representative Max Baucus' office
learned later that even though McDonald had initially
expressed a willingness to discuss the issue with Judge, the
provincial government concluded that such a discussion
would be premature in light of the "preliminary" nature of
activities on Cabin Creek. The NDP government, however,

certainly had sufficient experience in such matters to realize
that whether "preliminary" or not, the Cabin Creek activities
had generated anxiety in Montana over a perceived threat to
the state's interests. Discussion of the perceived threat
between representatives of the two governments was a
reasonable prospect under the circumstances, and the
provincial government's response is difficult to understand.
Until late October of 1975, there was little hope in the U.S.
State Department that British Columbia's NDP government
would endorse formal consultations with the United States
over Cabin Creek, at least until Rio Algom applied for coal
production licensing. One State Department official
suggested that the NDP was ''fond of pulling the Eagle's
feathers," partly because of an inherently nationalistic
proclivity and partly because of perceived American
intransigence on the Skagit issue.
The NDP's ever more tenuous political position
complicated the Cabin Creek matter as 1975 wore on. On
November 26, 1975, just weeks before British Columbia's
provincial elections, the Dominion accepted · the State
Department's October 20 proposal for consultations on
Cabin Creek. Ottawa suggested that the first round of
discussions be held early in 1976. On December 11, 1975, the
voters of British Columbia went to the polls and delivered a
resounding landslide victory to William Bennett and the
Social Credit Party. The election did little, however, to
clarify the future of Cabin Creek and Montana's Flathead
River. On the one hand, the Social Credit Party had amply
proved its capabilities and skills in cooperating with the
United States on transboundary water problems. Bennett,
after all, had been Premier during the Canadian ratification
of the Columbia River Treaty and had exhibited none of the
NDP's proclivity toward "pulling the Eagle's feathers."
Officials of the U.S. State Department were privately
optimistic over the probability of fruitful negotiations with
the Bennett government on Cabin Creek.
On the other hand, the Social Credit Party had made an
issue of the NDP's failure to promote new mining.
Montanans wondered if the Bennett government would
initiate a "crash" program to maximize coal production at
the expense of the Flathead River. State Department officers
wondered if political realities would severely constrain the
Social Credit Party's perception of British Columbia's
responsibilities under the Boundary Waters Treaty. Clearly,
the provincial election portended change with respect to
Cabin Creek, but few Americans could venture predictions
on the kind of change.
In preparing for the Cabin Creek talks, the State
Department formed an interagency task force comprised of
five agencies within the Department of the Interior, the U.S.
Forest Service and the Environmental Protection Agency.
The key Interior Department agencies were the Bureau of
Mines, the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S.
Geological Survey. The task force drafted papers on a range
of technical questions that included the potential
transboundary pollution threat from planned mining
activities on Cabin Creek and the need for expanded
cooperation with the Canadians in preserving the Flathead
region. The task force sought to supply to American
negotiators the scientific and technological background
required for realistic evaluation of anticipated Canadian
positions during the forthcoming consultations. The State
Department knew from experience that transboundary
water issues often center on esoteric scientific questions, and
6
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With these and other questions in mind, negotiators
representing the State Department and the government of
Montana sat down to a table with representatives of British
Columbia and the Dominion on March 9, 1976, in Ottawa.
To the relief of many Montanans, the provincial negotiators
receded from the previous "vague assurances" rendered by
the Barrett government, and offered instead to discuss
specific ways to ensure the protection of Montana's interests
on the Flathead River. As Professor Hans Peterson of
Northern Montana College notes, the Canadians offered to
provide "detailed environmental impact studies" relating to
the Cabin Creek operation "as these become available," and
to obtain input both from Montana and the State
Department of the effectiveness of provincial licensing
requirements in protecting the Boundary Waters Treaty.
Further consultations, they agreed, could be held in the
event that Montana discovered dangers in the provincial
licensing plans.
In accordance with the agreement, British Columbia
subsequently furnished to American authorities a comprehensive three-stage licensing plan. Stage I provides for a
detailed "preliminary assessment" by Rio Algom (for
review and possible modification by the province) of the full
range of its anticipated activities on Cabin Creek. Included is
analysis of existing data for the purpose of identifying "data
gaps" which must be filled to ensure effective enforcement of
the law.
Following the review and acceptance of Stage I, Rio
Algom will prepare a more detailed development program
that includes site specific impact statements as the operation
bears on water, aquatic and air resources-Stage IL The
province will then review this program with special attention
to suggested alternative ways of managing and minimizing
the impacts.
Stage III is the final preparation of operational plans in
accordance with the province's evaluations and stipulations
pursuant to the previous stage. Following Rio Algom's
applications for the necessary licenses, the government will
prepare programs and systems to monitor the construction
and operation of the Cabin Creek mine. Cabinet approval or
denial of the licensing applications is the culmination of
Stage III.
The critical feature of the system is Montana's access to
the mountain of studies, reports and evaluations attendant
to the licensing process. While the Ottawa agreement
guaranteed this access, the burden of recognizing and acting
on potential threats to its own Flathead interests rests
squarely on Montana's shoulders. Whether the government
of Montana possesses the wherewithal and resolve to guard
diligently against degradation of the Flathead River is a
matter that must be left to others to pursue. Despite its
enormous resources and its demonstrated resolve, the State
Department faces myriad controversies and issues relating
to U.S.-Canadian relations and cannot be expected to act
energetically on the Cabin Creek issue if Montana is not
"willing to carry its own ball."
The licensing process is underway. British Columbia's
Minister of the Environment, James A. Nielsen, reported to
Max Baucus on October 22, 1976, that Rio Algom had
submitted a Stage I report and that the various provincial
agencies had completed their respective reviews. Still
uncertain, however, is whether the Sage Creek Project is
economically feasible from Rio Algom's perspective, at least
over the short term. Nielsen's letter to Baucus mentioned

that workable answers to such questions necessitate close
support from the scientific community.
The government of Montana also made preparations. Bill
Christiansen, then Lieutenant Governor, held the office
charged with responsibility for dealing with the Cabin Creek
issue. He and his staff collected scientific data on the current
base line quality of the Flathead drainage, and met
periodically with the federal task force to develop positions
and strategies. Christiansen's office had considerable
previous experience in such matters, notably in the Poplar
River controversy discussed earlier.
A major source of American apprehension was the nature
of British Columbia's laws governing pollution control and
reclamation by coal mine operators. The province's Coal
Mines Regulation Act lacks clearly defined standards for
denial of coal mining licenses, a fact that troubled
Montanans who are accustomed to the kind of specificity
found in Montana's Strip Mining and Reclamation Act. The
"comprehensive procedure for minimizing environmental
damage" is tenuously rooted in statute, by American
standards, inasmuch as the Coal Mines Regulation Act
requires only that mine operators "maintain a reclamation
program" and that they leave the land and water courses in a
condition satisfactory" to British Columbia's Minister of
Mines and Petroleum Resources.
By contrast, the Montana act provides for disapproval of
licensing applications when "the overburden on any part of
the ... land described in the application" cannot be disposed
of without "substantial deposition of sediment in the
streambeds, landslides, or water pollution.... " Moreover,
the Montana statute provides remedies for individuals who
are damaged as a result of water pollution from coal mining
operations: "An owner of ... real property who obtains all
or part of his supply of water ... from an underground
source ... may sue an operator to recover damages for
contamination, diminution, or interruption of the water
supply.... "
The real effect of British Columbia's mining laws is not
readily apparent in the language of the actual statutes. The
licensing process itself is a better indicator since it reveals a
highly developed procedure which involves scrutiny of
licensing applications by professionals within several
provincial bureaucracies. Leaving the land "in a condition
satisfactory to the Minister" involves preparation oflengthy
production and reclamation programs by the operators and
approval of these programs by (1) the Minister of Lands,
Forests, and Water Resources, (2) the Minister of
Recreation and Conservation, and (3) the Minister of
Agriculture. The professional staffs of the conulting
ministries evaluate the proposed programs and submit to the
respective executives their recommendations for
enforcement not only of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, but
also of the Water Pollution Control Act, the Environmental
Land Use Act and others. While the lack of specific statutory
language implies a high degree of discretion on the part of
the Minister of Mines and Petroleum Resources, the actual
licensing procedure reveals that the government of British
Columbia takes the law very seriously. Less distinct are the
parameters of ministerial discretion in light of public
opinion on a given mining issue and-equally
important-the nonstandard nature of the law. Implied is
the possibility that satisfying the minister with respect to one
licensing application may not be the same as satisfying him
with respect to another.
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that Rio Algom has contemplated "a smaller scale
development" at Cabin Creek, ostensibly because of
fluctuating marketing conditions abroad.
Whether Montana confronts the reality of Cabin Creek
coal mining as an immediate or distant development, the
reality itself remains. Given the existence of the Crowsnest
Field and its geographical proximity to transboundary water
flow, and given the fact of an energy-hungry world that turns
its eyes more and more to coal, a clear need emerges to
modify the institutions for dealing with Cabin Creek-type
issues. A number of considerations lead to this conclusion.
First, there is no guarantee that Canada's Department of
External Affairs and America's State Department, the
functional entities of the Boundary Water Treaty, can
adequately represent the interests of Canadian provinces
and American states in transboundary water issues. This is
woefully apparent in the handling of the Poplar River and
Skagit Valley issues. In the Poplar River affair, the
Department of External Affairs appears unable to restrain
Saskatchewan from acting unilaterally despite agreements
to do otherwise with Montana and the State Department. In
the Skagit Valley affair, the State Department appears
unable to influence the decision on whether to permit the
raising of Ross Dam while the Department of External
Affairs is similarly unable to protect the interests of British
Columbia. The very proliferation of border
controversies- concerning transboundary water and air,
television broadcasting and a host of others- limits the time
and energies the State Department can devote to any single
issue. States like Montana are consequently forced into the
unfamiliar arena of international relations when confronted
with a problem like the Poplar River or Cabin Creek issues.
Second, existing institutions do not account adequately
for Canadian federalism. The major written component of
Canada's constitution, the British North America Act,
engendered a clear principle of "Divided Sovereignty," and
allocated to the provinces the power to deal with all matters
relating to property. Provinces have nearly exclusive
jurisdiction in disposition of natural resources on publicly
owned lands.
In view of Canadian federalism, the Boundary Waters
Treaty should have been signed by the United States and
each of the provinces. "Injury to health and property" are
provincial concerns. Seldom if ever does the Dominion

interfere in those concerns. The need, then, is for a new
framework of American-Canadian relations that promotes a
maximum degree of closeness and cooperation between the
provinces and the various echelons of American
government.
Could such a "new framework" be formalized by written
agreement? There is little reason to think not. A compact
signed by the governments of the ·united States, Montana
and British Columbia-aimed specifically at coordinated
multilateral examination of trans boundary water issues and
cooperative efforts to deal with them-should be a realistic
goal. An important feature of any new mechanism is public
education as to the stakes such issues involve. The
signatories would thus be able to gauge each others' political
constraints through input from interest groups and
associations, and would be better able to exercise the "art of
the possible" in formulating proposals and goals. Such a
compact could serve as a blueprint for other states and other
provinces to follow in seeking solutions to their respective
controversies.
British Columbia's display of good faith in the Ottawa
Cabin Creek agreement does not end the issue. Mentioned
earlier was the question of whether Montana can take
advantage of the province's willingness to share the
evaluation oflicensing applications. Although this is a major
concern, more fundamental questions arise. Can the
application of high technology suggested by the three-stage
licensing procedure render any kind of coal mine on Cabin
Creek harmless to the Flathead Valley? What would happen
if Montana and the State Department objected to a given
licensing requirement and subsequent negotiations yielded
no satisfactory compromise? Would British Columbia
accede to American urgings to deny approval of the
applications, thus foregoing the revenue and economic
stimulus of renewed mining? These are questions that may
not be properly addressed within the confines of present
arrangements.
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